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1. Introduction 
 
 Generating electricity from fossil fuels releases carbon dioxide into the atmosphere as a 
negative externality.  In the absence of a policy mechanism, electricity generators will not pay 
for the damage done by their carbon dioxide emissions and, as a result, each generator will 
overproduce electricity compared to the social equilibrium.  This is a clear market failure and 
without a corrective policy, the electricity market will not reach allocative efficiency.  Carefully 
designed economic policy encouraging electricity from renewable energy sources is one way to 
reduce externalities and possibly bring the market closer towards allocative efficiency.   
Numerous policy mechanisms promote renewable electricity and many governments use 
multiple policies at once.  Renewable electricity is defined for this thesis as electricity produced 
from renewable sources of energy.  Hydro, wind, solar, tidal, wave, biomass, and geothermal are 
examples of renewable sources of electricity, but nuclear and coal are not.  Ragwitz et al. listed 
eight classifications for policies promoting renewable electricity, from investment incentives to 
environmental taxes (2007, p. 3).  The Stern Review included a similar list of nine “existing 
deployment incentives” (2006, p. 366).  The United States federal government currently employs 
a number of these policies, mostly investment-focused policies including production tax credits, 
investment tax credits, and capital grants for renewable electricity (REN21, 2007, p. 23).  On the 
US state level, generation-based policies exist including thirty-two states with renewable 
portfolio standards (RPS), and one state (California) with a feed-in tariff (FIT).  For an 
explanation of RPS and FIT policies, see Sections 2.1 and 2.2.   
A debate exists as to whether or not the federal government should adopt a generation-
based policy such as an RPS or a FIT, and if so, which one (Rickerson & Grace, 2007; Nelson, 
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2006; Rickerson, Bennhold, & Bradbury, 2008).  Since mid-2008, bills for both policies have 
been introduced in Congress but the bills have failed to garner enough support to pass into law 
(Rickerson et al., 2008).  It is important that the costs and benefits of these policies be 
understood and evaluated.  Unless a policy provides a net benefit to society, it should not be 
implemented, and in the face of multiple policy options, only the most cost-effective policy and 
the policy nearest to allocative efficiency should be considered. 
A large body of literature compares and contrasts renewable portfolio standards and feed-
in tariffs (Fouquet et al., 2005; Lauber, 2004; Rickerson & Grace, 2007).  The goal of this thesis 
is to further the discussion, specifically at the US federal level.  The data examined in this thesis 
come from the Energy Information Administration (EIA), which in 2007 modeled the possible 
impacts of different renewable portfolio standards in the US between 2005 and 2030.  The data 
from the EIA models are examined in a benefit-cost analysis and the results are compared to the 
performance of renewable electricity policies in Germany and the United Kingdom.  
Synthesizing the analyses, a policy direction is recommended for the United States.  
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2. Background 
 
2.1 What is an RPS? 
Renewable portfolio standards (RPS) are quantity-setting policies.  Under an RPS, 
utilities are responsible for supplying renewable electricity at a set percentage of total electricity 
supplied each year.  For each unit of renewable electricity supplied to customers, a utility earns a 
Renewable Energy Certificate (REC).  At the end of the year, each utility is required to possess a 
minimum number of RECs in relation to the amount of total electricity it supplied.  For example, 
the government may require that every utility have RECs to cover at least 25% of that utility’s 
total electricity supplied that year.  The key factor in an RPS policy is that RECs can be bought 
and sold on an open market.  As a result, firms will choose the cost-minimizing method to obtain 
their RECs, whether through renewable electricity generation or through buying RECs on the 
market.  In a standard RPS, no differentiation exists between renewable electricity generation 
technologies.  One REC from biomass is equivalent to one REC from solar, even if it costs more 
to generate that electricity from the solar plant.   
 
2.2 What is a FIT? 
A feed-in tariff (FIT) is a price-setting policy.  Under a FIT, the government sets the price 
for renewable electricity at some level higher than the prevailing electricity market price.  The 
fixed price, or fixed tariff, usually differentiates between generation technologies and is set high 
enough to ensure a reasonable rate of return on the investment in the technology.  Every 
generator of renewable electricity is then guaranteed that its electricity will be bought by a 
utility, and it will be bought at the fixed-price set by the government.  This guarantee remains in 
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place for a set number of years.  Cost-sharing mechanisms are created to share the burden across 
all utilities.   
An example of a FIT policy can be seen in Table 1.  Germany’s FIT, called the 
Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG), was instituted in 2000 and the data in Table 1 are specific 
to the year 2009.  Each technology is listed in the first column and the fixed price, or tariff, for 
that technology is in the second column.  Notice that there is a range of tariffs offered to each 
technology.  This is because the offered tariff changes with the specific size and location of each 
generator in order to ensure a reasonable rate of return.  For example, roof-mounted solar panels 
receive a higher tariff than ground-mounted panels, but building façade-mounted solar panels 
receive the highest tariff offered to solar.  Column three includes the duration of the tariff.  With 
Germany’s FIT, every tariff is fixed for twenty years plus the initial year of generating.   
Another aspect of the policy includes an annual reduction, or degression, of tariffs at a 
pre-determined rate.  The purpose of the degression is to reward quick adoption of renewables.  
For example, if a solar plant first began generating electricity in 2009 it may receive a tariff of 
31.94 € cents per kWh, locked in for twenty years, but if an identical plant were to begin 
generating electricity a year later in 2010, it may receive a lower tariff of 28.75 € cents per kWh 
for the next twenty years.  This is a 3.19 € cent reduction in the offered tariff between 2009 and 
2010, or a degression rate of 10%.  The rate of degression in Germany is between 0% and 10% 
depending on the technology and year (German Bundestag, 2008).   
A FIT encourages growth in specific generation technologies, even though the costs of 
each generation technology are different.  In Germany, a solar photovoltaic generation plant 
opening in 2009 receives a tariff about ten times larger than a new large hydro plant.  Also note 
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that technologies not covered by this policy, such as wave and tidal, do not receive any 
remuneration under this policy.   
 
Table 1 – An Example of a FIT Policy 
 
Germany’s FIT support levels and duration 
For the year 2009 
Technology Tariff 
€ cents per kWh 
Duration 
In Years 
Small Hydro 
<5 MW 
7.65 – 12.67 20 
Large Hydro 
>5 MW 
3.50 – 7.29 20 
Wind  
Onshore 
5.02 – 9.20 20 
Wind  
Offshore 
3.50 – 13.00 20 
Solid Biomass 
 
7.79 – 11.67 20 
Biogas 
 
4.16 – 9.00 20 
Solar Radiation 
 
31.94 – 43.01 20 
Geothermal 
 
10.50 – 16.00 20 
Source: German Bundestag, 2008 
 
 
2.3 Literature 
In 1999, the Commission for the European Communities (CEC) announced that it would 
examine the possibility of creating a harmonized framework for renewable electricity policies in 
the European Union (EU) (CEC, 1999).  At the time, two principal types of policies existed in 
the EU member states.  Germany, Spain, and Denmark had versions of fixed-price policies such 
as FITs, while the United Kingdom and Italy had versions of fixed-quantity policies such as RPS 
policies (REN21, 2007).  A debate emerged in the literature between the two different 
approaches, and which should be incorporated into a “harmonized Community framework” 
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(Lauber, 2004, p. 1).  A number of authors began to evaluate existing policies in EU member 
states.  Sijm (2002) and Stryi-Hipp (2004) critically evaluated Germany’s policies, while Toke 
(2005) critically examined the UK’s policies.  Other authors directly compared the performance 
of the different policies with one another, but no clear conclusions were drawn, only pros and 
cons of each policy (Lauber, 2004; Fouquet et al., 2005; Bundesverband WindEnergie, 2005; 
Menanteau et al., 2003; Mitchell et al., 2006; Sawin, 2004).  Huber et al. (2004) reported the 
results from the leading EU computer modeling project called Green-X and summarized the 
consensus of literature well with their conclusion, “There is no clear favoured support 
mechanism, as each instrument has its pro and cons [sic].  Which instrument is to be preferable 
depends on the specific policy objective” (p. 39).  
In 2005, the CEC published a report in response to its 1999 push for harmonization.  The 
2005 report stated, “Major regulatory change at Community level in the short term is not 
recommended…However, the Commission will further analyse the options for and impacts of 
increased optimisation, coordination and possible harmonisation” (CEC, 2005, p. 18).  The 
debate raged on and spilled onto other continents (Ragwitz et al., 2006; Toke, 2007b).   
A number of reports have been written about adopting a FIT or RPS in the US, a country 
with neither policy, but again no consensus emerged as to which policy to implement (Rickerson 
& Grace, 2007; Rickerson et al., 2008; Wiser et al., 2004; Nelson, 2006).  Other countries across 
the globe began to debate the merits of an RPS or FIT.  Del Rio and Gaul (2007) examined 
possible modifications to Spain’s FIT.  Wiser et al. (2002) discussed possible directions for 
Chinese policy, and Prest (2008) supported the adoption of a FIT policy in Australia.   
Recently, there was a push for combining the two policy approaches.  Midttun and 
Gautesen (2007) argued that the debate between FIT and RPS approaches does not sufficiently 
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reflect the dynamic character of product development, and there is a clear need for both 
approaches at once.  Toke (2007a) came to the same conclusion when he analyzed the feasibility 
of a FIT in the United Kingdom and found significant benefits from a harmonization of the UK 
quantity-based system with a FIT.   
Much of the literature pulls from theory and past experiences.  The focus of this thesis is 
forecasting the actual costs and benefits of implementing a policy using available forecasts.  
Modeling the future of the electricity industry is a complex task that requires more time and 
resources than are available for this thesis, so models are used that are created by the EIA to 
forecast policy implications from 2005 to 2030.  These models have not yet been examined with 
a thorough benefit-cost analysis, and this is where this thesis adds value.  A purely monetary 
benefit-cost analysis framework is employed to examine the impact of quantity-based policies in 
the US.  The same analysis framework is applied to a price-based policy in Germany and another 
quantity-based policy in the United Kingdom to directly compare these policies to possible US 
policies.  This analysis brings a new perspective to the policy debate in the US.   
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3. Theory 
Economic theory provides a useful framework for a comparison of FITs with RPS.  This 
section provides a basic understanding of the policies and how economic theory views their 
effectiveness.  Both policies can be represented with basic supply and demand curves, and the 
analysis of these curves reveals theoretical strengths and weaknesses of each policy.  
 
3.1 RPS Theory 
With an RPS, a minimum quantity of renewable electricity is fixed at a certain percentage 
of total electricity generation.  A utility will then demand renewable electricity from electricity 
generators in order to meet the minimum supply requirement.  Graph 1 is of the market for 
renewable electricity under an RPS policy at any given time.  On the x-axis is the quantity of all 
renewable electricity.  The demand curve is replaced by the vertical “Minimum Requirement 
Quantity” curve for all points except where the demand curve exceeds the minimum 
requirement.  At low prices, the generators are willing to supply more than the minimum 
requirement, so the result is the kinked demand curve seen in Graph 1.  The supply curve is 
upwards sloping because as more renewable generation is added, the cheap and easy renewable 
sources such as hydroelectric and ideal wind turbine locations are used up and more costly 
methods such as solar must be used.  The intersection of the new demand curve and the supply 
curve represents the renewable energy certificate (REC) price.  It is reasonable to assume that the 
intersection will be on the vertical section of the demand curve because if not, the policy would 
be unnecessary.   
As the supply curve shifts for any number of reasons, the price of the REC shifts and the 
quantity remains constant, assuming the intersection remains in the vertical region.  An example 
  Renewable Electricity Policies
  
 
10 
of a supply shift from Supply to Supply’ is seen on Graph 1.  Shifts in any of the curves can be 
easily modeled using this same framework.  As total electricity supplied increases, the minimum 
required quantity must increase in order to fulfill the RPS requirements, and this would result in 
a rightward shift of the vertical portion of the demand curve.   
An RPS policy may not set the correct quantity for allocative efficiency due to imperfect 
information, but the policy may be a step in the right direction.  Once the set quantity is decided 
upon, trading of RECs allows the cheapest sources of renewable electricity to be exploited no 
matter the technology type, location, or size.  The firms, by minimizing their costs, will reach a 
point where the marginal cost of new renewable electricity will be equal across all utilities.  This 
results in a cost-effective outcome.   
Some RPS policies have extra incentives for specific technologies.  In an RPS examined 
later in this thesis, solar electricity is awarded three RECs for every one unit of generation.  
Other policy additions such as price caps on REC prices are possible.   
 
Graph 1 – Renewable Electricity Market under an RPS Policy  
 
Quantity of Renewable Electricity 
$
Supply 
Minimum Required 
Quantity 
Supply’ 
REC 
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Price 
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3.2 FIT Theory 
With a FIT, the quantity of renewable electricity fluctuates but the price is held constant.  
This is represented by the “Fixed Price” line in Graph 2 and Graph 3.  Both graphs represent the 
markets for a certain technology that generates renewable electricity.  At low levels of 
generation, the market price may actually be higher than the fixed price, represented by a kink in 
the demand curve.  This policy approach assumes the supply curve intersects a horizontal portion 
of the demand curve.  If the assumption does not hold, then the policy has no effect on market 
behavior.  As before, utilities are buyers and generators are sellers.  The supply curve is upward 
sloping.   
Instead of one market and one fixed price for all renewables, a FIT differentiates between 
technologies, creating a separate market for each technology, each with a unique quantity, supply 
curve, and fixed price.  Graph 2 represents the market for renewable energy produced from some 
technology A, and Graph 3 is for some technology B.  Under the German FIT, at least nine 
separate markets exist (see Table 1), and possibly many more due to the further breakdowns in 
each technology.  These markets are independent of one another.   
Shifts in a technology’s supply curve, the market size, or the fixed price will cause a 
variation in the quantity of renewable electricity generated from the affected technology.  The 
fixed price remains the same as long as the quantity does not dip below a certain point.  Graph 2 
and Graph 3 model this with a shift in the supply curve from Supply to Supply’.   
A FIT is allocatively efficient if the fixed price for each technology is set precisely at the 
allocatively efficient level given perfect information now and into the future.  Without perfect 
information, a FIT is not allocatively efficient.  Additionally, a FIT is not a cost-effective policy 
to encourage renewable electricity due to the differentiation between technologies.  In order to be 
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cost-effective, the lowest cost solutions must be utilized, but a FIT may support solar electricity 
at ten times the cost of hydro or wind.  In a socially optimal situation, all renewable energy 
technologies are perfect substitutes, but a FIT effectively separates the markets and the markets 
for each technology no longer directly respond to changes in the other markets.   
The FIT does result in benefits not captured in this analysis.  These benefits are from 
offering less risk to investors by guaranteeing a known minimum rate of return on capital 
investment.  The result is lower capital costs, and Mitchell et al. (2006) argued that this is a 
significant benefit in the FIT policy, and that an RPS policy results in higher capital costs.  Other 
benefits may be seen in terms of dynamic efficiency if the high levels of support for a currently 
expensive technology result in future technology breakthroughs.  The effect of a FIT on dynamic 
efficiency is not fully understood.   
 
Graph 2 – Market for Renewable Electricity Generated by Technology A 
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Graph 3 – Market for Renewable Electricity Generated by Technology B 
 
 
 
 
With perfect information, both policies reach allocatively efficient outcomes and are cost-
effective.  However in the absence of perfect information the policies will not reach allocative 
efficiency, but they should result in an equilibrium closer to allocative efficiency than would be 
achieved in a purely free market situation.  The RPS policy allows for trading of RECs, allowing 
the market to naturally reach a cost-effective solution.  The FIT policy distinguishes between 
different renewable electricity technologies, making it highly unlikely that a cost-effective 
solution will be reached.  This analysis suggests that an RPS policy is more cost-effective than a 
FIT.   
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4. Data 
Four separate data sets are used to examine the benefits and costs of FIT and RPS 
policies.  Each data set represents a different policy.  This section has a description of each 
policy and corresponding data.  A summary can be seen in Table 2. 
The first policy is a hypothetical US federal renewable portfolio standard mandating that 
by 2025 at least 25% of electricity supplied must come from renewable sources of energy (25x25 
policy).  The EIA examined the impact of this policy at the request of Senator Inhofe in January 
2007 (EIA, 2007c).  The EIA used a reference case and a policy case, and the impact of the 
policy is the difference between the two.  The reference case in this model is a slightly updated 
Annual Energy Outlook 2007 (AEO2007).  The data are from 2005 to 2030. 
The second policy is a hypothetical US federal RPS mandating that by 2020 at least 15% 
of electricity supplied must come from renewable sources of energy (15x20 policy).  Unlike the 
25x25 policy, this policy includes a number of further details including exceptions for small 
suppliers, caps on certificate prices, and triple RECs for solar.  Senator Bingaman requested that 
the EIA examine the impacts of such a policy in May of 2007 (EIA, 2007d).  Similar to the 
25x25 policy model, the EIA included a reference case and a policy case.  The reference case in 
this model is the AEO2007.  The data are from 2005 to 2030. 
In 2002, the United Kingdom implemented a quantity-based policy, called Renewables 
Obligation (RO).  The RO policy had the same premise as an RPS policy with a target of 10% 
renewable electricity by 2010, but instead of creating a market for renewable energy certificates, 
the RO allowed generators who fell short of the target to pay a fee per MWh set in 2002 and 
adjusted annually to the producer’s price index (Ofgem, 2007b).  These fees were referred to as 
buyouts and the fee level is the buyout price.  The buyout payments were then distributed 
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proportionately to generators who did generate renewable electricity.  The data are from 2003 to 
2007. 
Germany has had a feed-in tariff in place since 1990, but only since the introduction of 
the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz (EEG) in 2000 and its subsequent update in 2004 has Germany 
seen large impacts (Rickerson & Grace, 2007).  The EEG is a fully-developed feed-in tariff with 
technology differentiation, a 20-year fixed-payment guarantee, cost sharing mechanisms, and 
tariff degression.  Rickerson and Grace (2007) and Germany’s Federal Ministry for the 
Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU, 2008) explained the policies in 
further detail.  Complete data on the EEG are published regularly by the BMU and the EEG is 
cited as the basis for many best policy practices (Rickerson & Grace, 2007, pp 6).  The data are 
from 2005 to 2007. 
The reason for these four particular policies comes down to data availability and 
language barriers.  Many countries do not publish the specific data necessary for this in-depth 
analysis.  Other countries may publish the necessary data, but language barriers hindered their 
discovery.  Individual US states have many RPS policies in place, but they also do not release 
the detailed data necessary for this analysis.
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Table 2 – Policies Examined 
Policiy Policy Type Country Details Years 
25x25 Renewable 
Portfolio 
Standard 
 
 
USA 25% of supplied 
electricity must be 
renewable by 2025 
2005-2030 
15x20 Renewable 
Portfolio 
Standard 
 
 
USA 15% of supplied 
electricity must be 
renewable by 2020 
2005-2030 
RO 
 
Renewables 
Obligation 
Modified 
Renewable 
Portfolio 
Standard 
United 
Kingdom 
10% of supplied 
electricity must be 
renewable by 2010 
2003-2007 
EEG 
 
Erneuerbare-
Energien-
Gesetz 
Feed-In Tariff 
 
 
Germany Fixed tariff offered to 
renewable electricity 
generators according to 
technology and other 
factors 
2005-2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Model  
The goal of this section is to provide a framework for the analysis of the four policies.  
All calculations are built upon the two assumptions introduced in this section and basic economic 
theory.  The two assumptions are based upon data under the US form of regulation, so applying 
this analysis framework to Germany and the UK may be more theory than reality if the 
assumptions do not hold in those markets.   
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5.1 Assumptions 
The electricity industry traditionally experiences economies of scale in production.  
Examining this idea in the context of the 15x20 and 25x25 policies yields important results.  In 
the theoretical case of traditional economies of scale, average costs (ACs) are above marginal 
costs (MC) at all levels of production and both are constantly declining with increasing 
quantities.  However, an examination of data from the EIA models reveals that as the quantity of 
electricity generated and sold increases over time, AC remains nearly constant in real terms.  See 
Table 3 for supporting data.  As the quantity of electricity increases from 3.6 to 5.1 trillion kWh 
annually, the average cost in real terms remains approximately the same.  The only way for the 
AC to remain level over a range of quantities is if MC is equal to AC in that range of quantities.  
This can be represented graphically in Graph 4 with overlapping horizontal AC and MC curves 
in the known region.  Outside of the known region, the shape of the AC and MC curves is 
unknown and represented with dotted lines.  From the data, it can be concluded that:   
 
(1)  Supply is approximately perfectly elastic near market equilibriums 
 
Furthermore, when demand intersects the AC curve in this region, it also intersects the 
MC curve at the same point, so as a result, Price ≈ AC.  From this it follows that total revenues 
(TR) ≈ total costs (TC).  This is further supported by the regulatory environment in the energy 
industry.  Regulation of the electricity market permits each market supplier to recover costs and a 
set rate of return on capital, but little to no profits (EIA, 2007b, p. 9).  This result is: 
 
(2)  TR ≈ TC 
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Graph 4 – Electricity Market with Known Region of Flat AC   
 
 
 
Table 3 - Data from AEO2007.  Average cost is the sum of expenses and the return on rate base.  
Source:  Personal Correspondence with Lori Aniti from the EIA, February 9, 2008 
Year Quantity 
(bill kWh) 
Avg. Cost 
(2005¢/kWh) 
Year Quantity 
(bill kWh) 
Avg. Cost 
(2005¢/kWh) 
2005         3,660                8.10  2018         4,408                7.89  
2006         3,694                8.32  2019         4,466                7.88  
2007         3,757                8.30  2020         4,528                7.90  
2008         3,836                8.29  2021         4,580                7.92  
2009         3,891                8.20  2022         4,641                7.93  
2010         3,953                8.07  2023         4,699                7.95  
2011         4,014                7.88  2024         4,765                7.99  
2012         4,082                7.78  2025         4,827                8.01  
2013         4,138                7.73  2026         4,894                8.00  
2014         4,194                7.69  2027         4,965                7.99  
2015         4,251                7.69  2028         5,038                8.01  
2016         4,312                7.74  2029         5,099                8.05  
2017         4,358                7.83  
 
2030         5,168                8.05  
D 
MC 
AC 
$ 
Q of Total Electricity Generation 
Known Region 
O 
MC 
AC 
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5.2 Externalities 
The model starts with the simple idea of negative externalities in the electricity market.  
The negative externalities represent the emissions of carbon dioxide by electricity generators.  A 
representation of this idea is seen in Graph 5.  The marginal social cost curve is represented as 
MSC and is the sum of the marginal private cost curve MPC and the marginal external costs 
MECs.  The marginal external costs are represented by the area between the MSC and MPC.  
The market equilibrium absent intervention is at the point E with quantity Q and price P.  This is 
the intersection of MPC and the marginal social benefit or demand curve.  However, the socially 
optimal and allocatively efficient point is at E’ with a higher price P’ and a lower quantity Q’.   
A traditional solution to the externality problem is to impose a tax on electricity or on the 
externalities.  The ideal tax would bring the market from equilibrium E to equilibrium E’, the 
socially optimal point.  This would incrementally reduce external costs by the area below the 
MSC curve but above the MPC curve between Q and Q’, represented on Graph 5 by the shaded 
area A.  The rest of the external costs from O to Q’, represented by B, would still remain.   
A policy promoting renewable electricity has an extra aspect to it.  A renewable 
electricity policy can be represented by introducing higher costs, shifting the MPC curve up to 
MPCR, but at the same time significantly reducing the externality.  The key is this reduction in 
the externality.  For ease, assume the external costs are reduced to near-zero, so the MPCR and 
the MSCR curve are approximately the same curve.  The policy equilibrium is then at the 
intersection of MPCR and the demand curve, and there are nearly no externalities.  If the 
equilibrium under a renewable electricity policy were to be E’, shown in Graph 5, the price and 
quantity would be identical to the situation under a tax, but the tax scenario would have an 
externality of B and the renewable electricity policy would not have any externalities.   
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Graph 5 – Electricity Market with Externalities 
 
 
5.3 Costs 
The next step is to look closer at the shift from MPC to MPCR, shortened to MPC and 
MPC’.  This section focuses on the costs and benefits of electricity production and consumption 
and disregards the idea of externalities for a while.  In Section 5.4 the change in externalities is 
examined.  To analyze the impact of this policy on private costs and benefits, a private benefit-
cost analysis is conducted using Graph 6.  A general private benefit-cost analysis can be seen in 
Table 4.  The benefits are the areas under the demand curve from the origin to the equilibrium 
quantity, and the costs are the areas under the MPC curves over the same distance.  Net benefits 
are benefits minus costs, and the net private policy cost is the change in net benefits after adding 
a policy.  Represented in the graph is (1), supply is approximately elastic near the equilibriums.  
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The exact shapes of the MPC and MPC’ curves outside the areas around the equilibriums are 
irrelevant and unknown, so they are represented with dashed lines.   
From Graph 6 it can be seen that the benefits of a market at equilibrium E are the areas 
under the demand curve up to quantity Q, or A+B+C+F+H.  The costs at equilibrium E are the 
areas under the MPC curve up to quantity Q, or A+H.  The net benefit is then B+C+F, or the 
benefits minus the costs.  A hypothetical policy then shifts the MPC curve up to MPC’ resulting 
in equilibrium E’.  The benefits at E’ are A+B+C and the costs are A+B.  Subtracting the costs 
from the benefits yields a net benefit of C at E’.  The difference in net benefits between the 
original equilibrium E and the policy equilibrium E’ is the difference between B+C+F and C, or 
B+F.  Therefore private market players have a net loss of the areas of B and F when the policy is 
implemented.  This can be thought of as the area under the demand curve and between the two 
MPC curves.  F is a private dead-weight loss and B is the loss resulting from increased costs.  
Later these costs are compared with the benefits from a reduction in negative externalities to 
come up with a net change in societal welfare.   
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Graph 6 – Electricity Market and the Introduction of Higher Costs through a Policy 
 
 
Table 4 – Private Benefit-Cost Analysis of Graph 6 
 Benefits Costs Net Benefit 
No Policy A,B,C,F,H A,H +  (B,C,F) 
Policy  A,B,C A,B +  (C) 
Net Change 
(Private) 
  -   (B,F) 
 
 
The areas of B and F are the net private cost of a policy.  Calculating the area of F is 
straightforward.  At small intervals, the demand curve can be approximated to be straight, and in 
the 25x25 and 15x20 policies, the maximum change in quantity between E and E’ is 2% of Q 
with an average reduction of less that 0.5% of Q.  This is a sufficiently small interval to assume 
that the curve is approximately straight.  Then the area of F is a right triangle with a base of the 
change in quantity and a height of the change in price.   
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A direct calculation of the area of B is not possible since the shapes of the MPC curves 
are unknown.  However, total revenues under each case are available, and using (2), which states 
that TR ≈ TC, total revenues proxy for total costs.  Using Graph 7 and (2), an approximation can 
be made of area B.  The changes in total revenue and total cost are each the net of two parts.  
Revenue increases by ∆P * Q’ and decreases by ∆Q * P.  Costs increase by B, some unknown 
area, and decrease by ∆Q * P, represented by H in Graph 6.  The net changes are equal, so it 
follows that the area of B must be equal to ∆P * Q’.  This works for any shape of the cost curve 
as long as (2) holds true.   
 
Graph 7 – Electricity Markets, using ∆TR to approximate the area of B.   
 
 
Using the information above, an equation for calculating the private costs of a policy 
under (1) and (2) is:   
 
(3) Net Private Costs = ½ (∆Q) (∆P) + (∆P) (Q’) 
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5.4 Benefits 
A readily available and easily quantifiable benefit of an RPS or FIT policy is avoided 
carbon dioxide emissions.  However, carbon dioxide’s long atmospheric life and uncertain 
effects upon the global climate make it difficult to translate the weight of emissions into dollars.  
Many studies have been published estimating the marginal damage cost of carbon dioxide 
emissions, or social cost of carbon (SCC), and the estimates vary widely.  SCC is the present 
value of all future effects of one metric ton of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere.  To 
analyze the four models, three sources of SCC estimates are used. 
The first source is from a report for the United Kingdom modeling SCC for 
policymakers.  The report’s model indicated a 2.4% annual real increase in SCC between 2001 
and 2060 due to the increasing marginal damage of emissions (Watkiss et al., 2005, p. 114).  
Using 2.4% as a rate of growth allows for an analysis of the policies over time.   
The second source is a 2005 study by Richard Tol.  Tol (2005) analyzed 103 SCC 
estimates from twenty-eight published studies and found that the data had a mode of $2 per 
metric ton of carbon dioxide ($/tCO2), a median of $14/tCO2, and a mean of $93/tCO2.  Tol 
concluded that it is very unlikely that the SCC is greater than $50/tCO2.  For analysis purposes, 
Tol’s median of $14/tCO2 is used as a 2004 SCC estimate.  This is assumed to increase to 
$14.336 in 2005 due to the 2.4% annual increase in the SCC and continue to increase annually, 
but this estimate will be referred to as $14/tCO2 for simplicity.   
The last source is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and its Fourth 
Assessment Report (AR4).  In the AR4, the IPCC claimed that in 2005, the average estimated 
value for SCC in peer-reviewed reports was $12/tCO2 (IPCC, 2007).  $12/tCO2 is used as a 
2005 SCC estimate. 
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The two values of SCC used, $12 and $14 /tCO2, are averages from many different 
studies, and using these values hides the element of uncertainty underlying the estimates.  5% of 
the studies examined by Tol (2005) estimated a SCC of over $350/tCO2 with a maximum value 
over $1,000/tCO2.  A number of estimates also had the SCC as a negative number, indicating a 
global economic gain from releasing more carbon dioxide.  Tol claimed that the two factors 
influencing the models are the discount rates applied to the costs and the aggregation methods 
between affected areas.   
 
5.5 Discounting 
The cost-side data for the EIA models were given in real 2005 dollars, and the EIA 
analysis applied a real discount rate of 7% (EIA, 2007c; EIA, 2007d).  The benefits-side data is 
based on the SCC, and Watkiss et al. (2005) claimed that the SCC increased at a real rate of 
2.4%.  Watkiss et al. used a real discount rate of 3.5% in their models.  In the following analyses, 
all numbers are in real 2005 dollars, the SCC increases annually by 2.4%, and three levels of 
discounting are reported: no discounting, a 3.5% discount rate, and a 7% discount rate.   
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6. Results 
 
6.1 25x25 and 15x20 
The two EIA models have enough information to calculate the benefits and costs 
associated with each of the two policies.  The calculations require only simple algebra using the 
frameworks set forth in the previous sections.  Refer to Table 5 for the complete results of the 
benefit-cost analysis of the 25x25 and 15x20 policies.  For each policy, the first column has the 
annual costs of the policy, calculated using formula (3).  The second column is the number of 
millions of metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions avoided annually.  These avoided emissions 
are then assigned a dollar value in columns three and four using different SCC estimates.   
As seen in Table 5, the benefits of the 25x25 policy are greater than the costs.  The 25x25 
policy is therefore economically feasible, meaning that it results in a net benefit to society.  
Undiscounted, the 25x25 policy has costs of $112 billion and the benefits are over $150 billion 
in 2005 dollars.  Discounted at 7%, the costs are $22 billion and benefits are over $40 billion.   
As seen in Table 5, the costs of the 15x20 policy are higher than the benefits.  The 15x20 
policy is therefore a net loss to society.  This holds true for both estimates of SCC used, and 
under all three discount rates.  At a 7% real discount rate, the SCC would have to be above 
$17/tCO2 for the policy to be feasible.   
A major factor in both policies is the effect of a decreased demand for fossil fuels upon 
the price of fossil fuels (EIA, 2007c; EIA, 2007d).  The 15x20 policy has a period between 2009 
and 2011 where the decreased price for fossil fuels more than offsets the cost of new renewable 
electricity.  The 25x25 policy has the same effect but to a greater extent due to a larger 
implementation of renewable electricity, and it happens 2013 to 2015 and 2020 to 2023.   
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Table 5 – Analysis of 15x20 and 25x25 Policies 
 
25x25 15x20 
 Costsa Benefitsa Costsa Benefitsa 
Year 
Annual 
Cost 
Avoided 
Emission 
SCC is 
$12/tb 
SCC is 
$14/tb 
Annual 
Cost 
Avoided 
Emission 
SCC is 
$12/tb 
SCC is 
$14/tb 
 Mill 05$ MtCO2 Mill 05$ Mill 05$ Mill 05$ MtCO2 Mill 05$ Mill 05$ 
2005 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2006 47 0 -3 -4 -155 0 3 3 
2007 115 0 4 4 145 0 -1 -2 
2008 372 1 14 17 21 -3 -35 -42 
2009 579 2 33 39 -411 -2 -27 -32 
2010 -135 40 544 650 -1,064 10 137 164 
2011 -544 71 978 1,169 -351 12 167 200 
2012 576 114 1,622 1,937 481 8 113 135 
2013 -1,760 135 1,963 2,345 192 58 835 998 
2014 -1,227 171 2,540 3,034 723 59 870 1,040 
2015 -120 200 3,039 3,631 693 53 799 955 
2016 412 233 3,637 4,345 -10 46 717 856 
2017 -29 264 4,218 5,039 1,240 149 2,372 2,834 
2018 313 293 4,793 5,726 2,267 137 2,245 2,682 
2019 235 327 5,464 6,528 2,269 136 2,274 2,716 
2020 -1,725 361 6,189 7,394 5,117 180 3,078 3,678 
2021 -1,958 403 7,072 8,448 6,659 195 3,423 4,089 
2022 -1,868 458 8,219 9,819 7,444 200 3,593 4,293 
2023 -479 511 9,393 11,221 7,409 203 3,738 4,465 
2024 2,253 558 10,504 12,549 7,340 207 3,895 4,653 
2025 12,464 621 11,968 14,298 7,175 211 4,065 4,857 
2026 18,516 640 12,636 15,096 7,313 211 4,174 4,986 
2027 17,046 650 13,152 15,712 8,181 215 4,340 5,184 
2028 20,496 674 13,962 16,680 9,371 215 4,451 5,317 
2029 24,023 703 14,914 17,817 7,921 220 4,670 5,579 
2030 24,893 724 15,712 18,771 8,072 222 4,822 5,761 
Totals Costs  Benefits  Costs  Benefits  
No disc $112,495 8,156 Mt $152,567 $182,267 $88,040  2,942 Mt $54,717 $65,368 
3.5% disc 48,780  79,260 94,690 43,141  28,639 34,214 
7% disc 21,709  41,964 50,133 21,865  15,202 18,161 
 Costs < Benefits  Costs > Benefits  
aReported on an annual basis, non-cumulative  bSCC increases annually at 2.4% in real terms 
Sources: EIA, 2007a; EIA, 2007b; EIA, 2007c; EIA 2007d; Personal correspondence, February 
9, 2008  
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6.2 Renewables Obligation 
Using (1) and (2), it is possible to complete an approximate benefits-cost analysis of the 
Renewables Obligation in the United Kingdom.  The validity of (1) and (2) in the UK’s 
electricity market is not certain, but assuming they are true allows for an approximation to be 
calculated.  This is done for comparison’s sake, to see how well the RO worked in the UK and if 
it is a policy the US should look into using.   
The costs to consumers, or total revenues, for the RO are calculated in government 
literature by multiplying the buy-out price by the quantity requirement, as if every supplier 
bought their way out of the generation requirements (Department for Business Enterprise & 
Regulatory Reform [BERR], 2007).  This calculation gives an approximate change in TR under 
the policy, which is an underestimate of the total costs to society.   
No estimation of the impact of the policy upon emissions has been released.  Since an 
exact number will not be reached, it is useful to calculate an upper bound to the possible benefits 
of the policy.  A reference case can be calculated simulating no renewable electricity growth 
from 2002 to 2007.  Comparing this simulated no-growth case to actual data from 2003 to 2007 
under the RO policy with significant renewable electricity growth results in an estimate of the 
policy’s effect.  This effectively assigns all renewable electricity growth from 2003 to 2007 to 
the policy and, reasonably assuming renewable electricity supply would grow even without the 
policy, this calculation is then the upper limit to the impact of the policy.    
The costs are underestimates and the benefits are overestimates, so the results should be 
significantly biased to a more favorable outcome.  However, even with the inherent biases, the 
RO has significantly higher costs than benefits, seen in Table 6.  Undiscounted, the RO policy 
cost over $4.5 billion with benefits under $0.25 billion in real 2005 dollars.  At a 7% discount 
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rate, the costs are over $4.4 billion and the benefits under $0.24 billion.  In order for the RO to 
have the benefits cover the costs at a discount rate of 7%, the SCC must be over $250/tCO2, over 
100 times larger than the SCC estimates from Tol (2005) and the IPCC (2007).  OFGEM, the 
organization that directly oversees the RO, estimated the break-even point to be even higher, at 
between $331 and $866 /tCO2 (£184-481 /tCO2) (Office of Gas and Electricity Markets 
[OFGEM], 2007a).     
The UK recognized that the RO was costly, and in 2007 the policy went under review.  
The reviewing process continued for two years, and a proposed reform of the RO was in the 
legislative process for approval in the spring of 2009 (BERR, 2008b).  The reasons given by 
OFGEM for the high costs were mainly administrative: an inadequate contract framework, 
regulatory and planning bottlenecks, and the duplicity of the RO and the EU carbon dioxide 
trading regime (OFGEM, 2007a). 
 
Table 6 – Analysis of the RO 
 
Renewables Obligation 
 Costs Benefitsd 
Year 
Annual 
Cost 
Avoided 
Emission 
SCC is 
$12/t 
SCC is 
$14/t 
 Mill 05$ MtCO2 Mill 05$ Mill 05$ 
2003 481a 0.6 6.9 8.3 
2004 785b 2.3 28.0 33.4 
2005 892c 3.7 45.0 53.8 
2006 1,021c 4.9 58.2 69.6 
2007 1,356c 5.8 68.2 81.5 
Totals Costs  Benefits  
No disc $4,536  17.3 Mt $206 $246 
3.5% disc 4,473  201 241 
7% disc 4,423  197 235 
 Costs > Benefits  
Sources:  aOFGEM, 2004  bOFGEM, 2005  cOFGEM, 2008 dBERR, 2006; BERR, 2007; BERR, 
2008a; House Of Commons, 2005 
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6.3 Germany’s EEG Policy Results 
The German government regularly reports data on the progress and impact of the FIT in 
Germany, called the EEG.  The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and 
Nuclear Safety (BMU) reports the cost of the EEG each year and the impact the EEG has had on 
emissions reductions.  Data from the BMU can be seen in Table 7.  The reported undiscounted 
cost of the EEG over three years starting in 2005 was $13 billion and the benefits were between 
$1.5 and $2 billion over that same time (BMU, 2008).  Discounted at 7%, the costs were $12 
billion and the benefits were under $2 billion.  The benefits clearly do not cover the costs.  The 
SCC would have to be about $95/tCO2 for the policy to break even at a 7% discount rate.  The 
BMU recognized this and often referred to a study by Kerwitt and Schlomann (2006) estimating 
the SCC at 70€, or over $100/tCO2.  Using this SCC as a benchmark, the BMU claimed that the 
benefits of the EEG are greater than the costs (BMU, 2008, p. 35).   
 
Table 7 – Analysis of the EEG 
 
Renewables Obligation 
 
 Costs  Benefits  
Year 
Annual 
Cost 
Avoided 
Emission 
SCC is 
$12/t 
SCC is 
$14/t 
 Mill 05$ MtCO2 Mill 05$ Mill 05$ 
2005 3,487 38 456 545 
2006 4,064 44 530 633 
2007 5,682 57 691 826 
Totals Costs  Benefits  
No disc $13,233  139 Mt $1,677 $2,004 
3.5% disc 12,718  1,614 1,928 
7% disc 12,248  1,555 1,858 
 Costs > Benefits  
Source:  BMU, 2008 
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6.4 Results Summary 
A complete summary of the examined polices can be seen in Table 8.  Different metrics 
are listed in the first column and the corresponding data from each policy are in the last four 
columns.  There are striking differences between the policies in the net benefits or costs.  The 
25x25 policy is the only policy to have a net benefit to society, while the 15x20, the EEG, and 
the RO all have net losses.  Examining the policies on a cost per avoided ton of CO2 basis 
reveals that the 25x25 policy is clearly the lowest cost policy, followed by the other RPS policy, 
the 15x20.  Germany’s FIT is about 10 times as costly per avoided ton of CO2 and the UK’s RO 
is about 40 times as costly.  In terms of growth of renewable electricity, the 25x25 policy 
encouraged the highest absolute renewables growth rate of 48 billion kWh per year, but 
Germany’s renewable electricity grew at the highest relative rate compared to its total electricity 
usage.   
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Table 8 – Summary of Results 
Policies Metrics 
25x25 15x20 EEG RO 
Number of years examined Years 25 25 3 5 
Total Benefits1 Mill 2005$ 50,133 18,161 1,858 235 
Total Costs2 Mill 2005$ 21,709 21,865 12,248 4,423 
Net Benefit (loss)2 Mill 2005$ 28,424 (3,704) (10,390) (4,188) 
Benefits to Costs Ratio 2.31 0.83 0.15 0.05 
Cost per avoided tCO22 2005$/tCO2 $6/tCO2 $17/tCO2 $95/tCO2 $268/tCO2 
% of total electricity as 
renewables at start of data  8.8% 8.8% 13% 2.7% 
% of total electricity as 
renewables at end of data  27.4% 13.8% 18% 5.0% 
Rate of renewable electricity 
installation Bill kWh/yr 48 17 8 2 
Total Avoided CO2 
Emissions Mt 8,156 2,942 139 17 
Average Annual Avoided 
CO2 Emissions Mt/yr 326 118  46 3  
1Discounted at 7%, SCC = $14/tCO2  2Discounted at 7%  Sources: All cited sources 
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7. Conclusion 
From a theoretical viewpoint, quantity-based renewable portfolio standards are more 
cost-effective than price-based feed-in tariffs in the absence of perfect information and without 
further information on dynamic efficiencies.  The differentiation between technologies in a FIT 
makes it extremely difficult to reach a level of cost-effective renewable electricity growth and 
the certificate trading aspect of an RPS allows for the cost-minimizing growth in renewables.   
The data clearly support the cost-effectiveness of an RPS.  The two RPS policies 
examined cost less per avoided ton of carbon dioxide emissions than the other two policies by a 
factor of 10.  The 25x25 RPS policy is the only policy with a net benefit to society, and therefore 
should be the only feasible policy option for the US out of the four policies examined.   
It is important to note that there are many uncertainties in this analysis.  This analysis 
does not rule out the possibility of other policies, either price-based or quantity-based, being 
feasible and even more cost-effective.  The comparisons are based upon forecasts and forecasts 
are only as good as the underlying data.  The UK’s experience with the RO teaches that the 
administrative details surrounding a policy may be critical to that policy’s success, and the 
forecasts may not accurately predict implementation challenges.  There may also be other 
benefits to each policy not included in this analysis, such as job creation and reductions in local 
pollutants or other greenhouse gases.   
However, the theory and data examined support a quantity-based renewable portfolio 
standard over a price-based feed-in tariff or quantity-based renewables obligation.  Among the 
four specific policies examined, the RPS requiring 25% renewable electricity by 2025 is the 
least-cost method of growing renewable electricity and it is the policy most desirable for 
implementation in the US.     
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